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Abstract
The Electoral Reform Society has called for more and better quality information to improve
democratic debate in relation to referendums. This article argues that, particularly in relation
to the European Union referendum, this would have had a marginal impact, because much
of the debate was not reducible to facts and emotional and dispositional factors were of
particular signiﬁcance in the campaign.
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IN SEPTEMBER 2016, the Electoral Reform Soci-
ety (ERS) published a review of the European
Union (EU) referendum of June 2016, enti-
tled It’s Good To Talk (IGTT), which included
critiques of aspects of its operation and rec-
ommendations for the running of future refer-
endums to ensure a better informed public
and a more deliberative and dialogic system
of politics. While these may be laudable aims,
some of the review’s observations about the
EU referendum exhibit a conceptualisation of
information and evidence in a political con-
text which is na€ıve and overly positivist and
involves some questionable assumptions
about the operation of politics. I address these
issues under four main themes, which are lar-
gely inter-connected: the status of information
and evidence; the question of contingency
and uncertainty; campaign negativity; and
the role of identity, disposition and culture in
positions adopted, and sides taken, in the ref-
erendum. Perhaps a disclaimer should be
posted here: I am not concerned with the
more general advantages and disadvantages
of the use of referendums in democracies, but
rather with the weaknesses of the analysis of
the EU campaign.
IGTT reported that research indicated that
people were not receiving sufﬁcient accurate
information and ‘the campaigns were not
doing enough to provide high-quality infor-
mation for voters’.1 The conclusion to the
report contains the recommendation that
‘an ofﬁcially sanctioned data set might help
to inform voters’ and there could be
intervention ‘by independent sources when
overtly misleading claims are made by ofﬁcial
campaigners’.2 However, it is difﬁcult to see
what sort of information and data would have
made a substantial difference to the debate.
As the ERS recognises, all facts need to be
interpreted and will be contested. An example
to illustrate this is the question of the size of
the European Commission bureaucracy. One
might imagine that it would be relatively sim-
ple to establish this. The EU’s own ﬁgures
estimate it at approximately 33,000, as do
sources sympathetic to the EU.3 It is claimed
that this ﬁgure is small relative to some state
and regional bureaucracies, and thus is evi-
dence that the Commission’s bureaucracy is
not inefﬁcient and bloated.4 However, this ﬁg-
ure is contested by some eurosceptics, with
one estimate from this side as high as
170,000.5 The lower ﬁgure appears the more
credible based on an examination of sources,
as the higher one includes lobbyists and those
outside the permanent bureaucracy, yet the
‘facts’, which are contested, do not settle the
issue. My contention is that ideas of European
bureaucracy (in terms of both excessive size
and lack of accountability) are so ingrained in
popular discourse that the facts are largely
overlooked. Additionally, for Leavers the
Commission lacks legitimacy, so that its size
and relative efﬁciency are less the issue than
its existence in the ﬁrst place, and no evidence
concerning its efﬁciency is likely to persuade.
Therefore, more and ‘better’ facts about the
European Commission, given how many
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were accessible, would have made little differ-
ence to the debate.
The Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS) was
viewed by many commentators as an organi-
sation which strove for objectivity, but there is
little evidence that its calculations or predic-
tions had any great impact, in particular as it
could be dismissed as another example of
establishment ‘expertise’, and therefore not to
be trusted, by those in the Brexit camp.6 The
ERS, in association with three universities,
established an online resource to provide infor-
mation and a forum for discussion on the
topics of social policy, migration and work,
crime and security, regions and nations and
economic impact. Such is the complexity and
contentious nature of these areas that it is
again difﬁcult to see what ‘facts’ or informa-
tion could be presented which would be
accepted by most observers and potential vot-
ers beyond the most trivial, banal or irrelevant.
If an agency of intervention, as recom-
mended by the ERS, had existed during the
EU campaign, it is impossible to know if it
would have had an impact. One must be
sceptical on the basis that those criticised by
it would probably have tried to impugn its
independence however it was funded or
whomever it was associated with. If it were
government-funded or part of the civil ser-
vice, it would have most likely been attacked
by Brexit as a part of the ‘establishment’ and
thus dismissed.
The general point here is that the unavoid-
able process of interpreting and contextualis-
ing ‘facts’ means that more or ‘better’
information is something of a red herring
and would not have transformed the cam-
paign. A second point is that, arguably, the
topic of the referendum made the limitations
of looking for facts and information to
improve democratic debate particularly
stark. Both sides were predicting how the
UK would evolve and fare outside the EU
and the pictures drawn were inevitably
coloured by speculation, the amount of vari-
ables involved and contingencies. While
some scenarios might seem more plausible
than others, facts and information became
even less relevant as the protagonists tried to
give a vision of the UK (or possibly the UK
without Scotland) ten years hence which had
to factor in the responses of the USA, China
and the EU, among other international
actors, to the UK’s departure. A moment’s
reﬂection on the variables involved and the
predictive inadequacies of economists and
other social scientists reveals how little
impact recourse to facts or data will have in
such an exercise. Neither of these two points
is intended to support some extreme rela-
tivism or postmodern dismissal of facts;
rather, the contention is that the availability
of more or better information would have
been marginal to the EU campaign in either
its prosecution or outcome.
The next issue to be addressed is that of
negativity. Both the electorate and the ERS
criticised the degree of negativity in the cam-
paign.7 Two issues will be discussed here.
The ﬁrst is a qualiﬁed defence of the use of
negative campaigning by politicians and
other activists; the second is the problem of
a lack of deﬁnition and interrogation of what
constitutes negativity. In a political cam-
paign, parties or other campaigning groups
will presumably try to maximise support
through a variety of strategies and tactics,
and it is not clear why critiques of oppo-
nents’ positions should not be considered
legitimate politics.8 One example cited in
IGTT was the Remain campaign’s estimates
of the economic costs of leaving the EU.9 It
is unclear whether is the principle of using
the predicted economic costs which consti-
tutes the negative campaigning to be
deplored or the speciﬁc estimates detailed in
the article. I would argue that neither should
be considered a problem and to label such a
strategy ‘Project Fear’, as did some of
Remain’s opponents, is facile. If the Remain
camp believed, as it probably genuinely did,
that leaving the EU would damage the UK’s
economy, it is legitimate politics to say so,
and should not be dismissed as negative
campaigning. The speciﬁc estimates of the
costs may be dubious; as indicated above, it
is unlikely that any speciﬁc calculations had
a good evidential basis. However, the
Remain camp presumably felt that, as a
political strategy, giving some speciﬁc esti-
mates would strengthen their case. If the
Leave camp believed, as I argue, that the
evidential base was weak, they were free to
engage in a campaign of challenge and
critique.
In the same paragraph in which Remain’s
economic estimates were detailed, IGTT gave
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three examples of Leave’s negative state-
ments. These were claims about potential
mass immigration from Turkey, comments
from Nigel Farage about sex attacks by
immigrants and Boris Johnson’s evocation of
Nazism in relation to the EU’s goals. Two
observations will be made here. First, does
this juxtaposition imply equivalence between
the negativity of the two camps? It could be
argued that contested economic predictions
qualitatively differ from racial stereotyping
or offensive jokes. However, this is not to
argue that the latter should be proscribed in
a political campaign. Beyond the legislative
proscription against incitement, slander, and
so on, there is an argument that the cut-and-
thrust of political debate and competition
has to allow for the unevidenced, the offen-
sive and the trivial, given the difﬁculty of
establishing a consensus on the limits to neg-
ative campaigning. The prevailing political
culture can act as a constraint upon such
excesses. If sufﬁcient numbers of the elec-
torate dislike negativity, however deﬁned,
then it will penalise candidates and cam-
paigners who employ it.
Second, what constitutes negativity or neg-
ative campaigning is not self-evident. It will
depend in part on how political language is
interpreted and the context in which it is used.
One example from the EU referendum will
illustrate this. The Leave campaign, and in
particular Farage, used the slogan ‘take our
country back’, or variations of it. For support-
ers of Leave, this could be interpreted as a
rallying cry to reclaim sovereignty and auton-
omy in governance. However, some Remain
supporters interpreted this slogan as implic-
itly racist or anti-immigrant, and for others it
was a facile slogan that, wilfully or otherwise,
failed to confront the complexities of global
interconnections and the concept of national
sovereignty in the twenty-ﬁrst century. In this
reading, Farage’s slogan is negative in the
sense that it was either racist, crudely pop-
ulist, or failed to address the realities of
contemporary global politics.
The ﬁnal aspect of the EU referendum
that raises doubts about the efﬁcacy of
increased information, data and, perhaps,
dialogue is that some support for the two
camps has been interpreted as representing
two different political cultures or identi-
ties.10 Those who supported Remain—
disproportionately the young, the formally
well-educated and residents of big cities—
were more supportive of a cluster of ideas
around shared sovereignty, multiculturalism,
cosmopolitanism and an identity that went
beyond and superseded a British one. Leave
supporters were a more heterogeneous group
and encompassed both afﬂuent, rural Conser-
vative areas and post-industrial, working-
class areas. For some Leave supporters, the
appeal lay in a more ‘traditional’ Britain (or,
more frequently, England) which embodied
an arguably outmoded conception of national
sovereignty and a more homogenous cultural
and racial composition.11 The European pro-
ject was also often associated with a political
elite which, for the working-class con-
stituency, had failed to provide stable employ-
ment, affordable housing and adequate public
services. Working-class support for Brexit was
often interpreted by Remain supporters as a
manifestation of the frustrations of those who
had suffered economically in a period of de-
industrialisation and globalisation. The argu-
ment is not that the material had no impact on
the campaign, but rather that a broad cultural
identity and political disposition was also sig-
niﬁcant. The importance of this is that the
details of the workings of the EU, the possibil-
ity of institutional reform and the cost of its
functioning (and debates therein) were of sec-
ondary importance. For many of the Remain
and Leave supporters, the details of the func-
tioning of the EU were of marginal signiﬁ-
cance. For many Remainers the EU was a
symbol of, and had a symbolic value as, a pos-
itive, inclusive, post-national, unchauvinistic
form of politics, whereas for many Leavers it
symbolised a loss of national autonomy and
British pride, and caused, or coincided with,
economic decline and marginalisation.
Conclusion: the positivist illusion
Among other recommendations, the ERS calls
for the provision of better quality and more
objective information to improve political
debate and to help with decision-making
among the electorate. My argument is that
such provision would have been of marginal
signiﬁcance in the EU referendum, for three
reasons: one generic and two more speciﬁc to
the referendum. Citizens and the electorate
will not necessarily reject or ignore facts, but
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they will be ﬁltered, interpreted and contextu-
alised through pre-existing ideological afﬁlia-
tions, dispositions and understandings.
Therefore, an ofﬁcially sanctioned data set or
something of that ilk would not necessarily be
seen as objective or help electors choose a
position. This is a general claim about knowl-
edge and evidence in the social world. In the
context of the EU debate, two more speciﬁc
factors are important. As it was not a contest
between the parties in the manner of a general
election, there was no ‘track record’ of compe-
tence in government to be considered and
debated by the electorate and, as indicated
above, the debate was largely about the likely
trajectory of the UK and the UK economy out-
side the EU. Therefore, hard data and uncon-
tentious facts were even more sparse and
marginal than in conventional political and
electoral competition and discourse. Addi-
tionally, within the binary context of a refer-
endum, EU membership was a symbol of the
cultural direction of the UK, of which Remain-
ers broadly approved, and which Leavers dis-
liked. Inasmuch as the contest was about
disposition, culture and identity, ‘facts’ about
the operation of the EU as an institution or its
‘real’ impact on the UK economy since 1973
were largely irrelevant. This is not to claim
that the electorate is irrational or atavistic. It is
to argue, rather, that the positivist emphasis
on facts, objectivity and evidence underesti-
mates the role of emotion, ideology and iden-
tity in political afﬁliation and choice and
overestimates the efﬁcacy of improved and
increased information.
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